Abstract
Introduction
Recent empirical research using longitudinal plant or Þrm-level data from several countries has overwhelmingly substantiated the existence of large and persistent productivity differences among establishments in the same narrowly deÞned industries. Some of these studies have further shown that these productivity differences are strongly correlated with the establishment's export status: relatively more productive establishments are much more likely to export (even within so-called "export sectors", a substantial portion of establishments do not export). Other studies have highlighted the large levels of resource reallocations that occur across establishments in the same industry. Some of these studies have also correlated these reallocations with the establishments' export status.
This paper develops a dynamic industry model with heterogeneous
Þrms to analyze the role of international trade as a catalyst for these inter-Þrm reallocations within an industry. The model is able to reproduce many of the most salient patterns emphasized by recent micro-level studies related to trade. The model shows how the exposure to trade induces only the more productive Þrms to export while simultaneously forcing the least productive Þrms to exit. Both the exit of the least productive Þrms and the additional export sales gained by the more productive Þrms reallocate market shares towards the more productive Þrms and contribute to an aggregate productivity increase. ProÞts are also reallocated towards more productive Þrms. The model is also consistent with the widely reported stories in the business press describing how the exposure to trade enhances the growth opportunities of some Þrms while simultaneously contributing to the downfall or "downsizing" of other Þrms in the same industry; similarly, protection from trade is often reported to shelter inefficient Þrms. Rigorous empirical work has recently corroborated this anecdotal evidence. Bernard and Jensen (1999a) (for the U.S.), Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) (for Taiwan), and Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) (for Colombia, Mexico, and Morocco) all Þnd evidence that more productive Þrms self-select into export markets. Aw, Chung and Roberts (2000) also Þnd evidence suggesting that exposure to trade forces the least productive Þrms to exit. Pavcnik (2002) directly looks at the contribution of market share reallocations to sectoral productivity growth following trade liberalization in Chile. She Þnds that these reallocations signiÞcantly contribute to productivity growth in the tradable sectors. In a related study, Bernard and Jensen (1999b) Þnd that within-sector market share reallocations towards more productive exporting plants accounts for 20% of U.S. manufacturing productivity growth.
Clearly, these empirical patterns can not be motivated without appealing to a model of trade incorporating Þrm heterogeneity. Towards this goal, this paper embeds Þrm productivity heterogeneity within Krugman's (1980) model of trade under monopolistic competition and increasing returns. The current model draws heavily from Hopenhayn's (1992a Hopenhayn's ( , 1992b work to explain the endogenous selection of heterogeneous Þrms in an industry. Hopenhayn derives the equilibrium distribution of Þrm productivity from the proÞt maximizing decisions of initially identical Þrms who are uncertain of their initial and future productivity. 1 This paper adapts his model to a monopolistically competitive industry (Hopenhayn only considers competitive Þrms) in a general equilibrium setting. 2 A contribution of this paper is to provide such a general equilibrium model incorporating Þrm heterogeneity that yet remains highly tractable. This is achieved by integrating Þrm heterogeneity in a way such that the relevance of the distribution of productivity levels for aggregate outcomes is completely summarized by a single "sufficient" statistic -an average Þrm productivity level. Once this productivity average is determined, the model with productivity heterogeneity yields identical aggregate outcomes as one with representative Þrms that all share the same average productivity level.
This simplicity does not come without some concessions. The analysis relies on the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) model of monopolistic competition. Although this modeling approach is quite common in the trade literature, it also exhibits some well-known limitations. In particular, the Þrms' markups are exogenously Þxed by the symmetric elasticity of substitution between varieties.
Another concession is the simpliÞcation of the Þrm productivity dynamics modeled by Hopenhayn (1992a) . Nevertheless, the current model preserves the initial Þrm uncertainty over productivity and the forward looking entry decision of Þrms facing sunk entry costs and expected future probabilities of exit. As in Hopenhayn (1992a) , the analysis is restricted to stationary equilibria. Firms correctly anticipate this stable aggregate environment when making all relevant decisions. The analysis then focuses on the long run effects of trade on the relative behavior and performance of Þrms with different productivity levels.
Another recent paper by Bernard, Eaton, Jenson and Kortum (2000) (henceforth BEJK) also 1 One of the most robust empirical patterns emerging from recent industry studies is that new entrants have lower average productivity and higher exit rates than older incumbents. This suggests that uncertainty concerning productivity is an important feature explaining the behavior of prospective and new entrants.
2 Montagna (1995) also adapts Hopenhayn's model to a monopolistic competition environment (in a partial equilibrium setting), but conÞnes the analysis to a static equilibrium with no entry or exit and further constrains the distribution of Þrm productivity levels to be uniform. Although it is assumed that only the more productive Þrms earning positive proÞts remain in the industry in future periods, the present value of these proÞts ßows does not enter into the Þrms' entry decision.
introduces Þrm-level heterogeneity into a model of trade by adapting a Ricardian model to Þrm-speciÞc comparative advantage. Both papers predict the same basic kinds of trade-induced reallocations, although the channels and motivations behind these reallocations vary. In BEJK, Þrms compete to produce the same variety -including competition between domestic and foreign producers of the same variety. This delivers an endogenous distribution of markups -a feature that is missing in this paper. BEJK also show how their model can be calibrated to provide a good Þt to a combination of micro and macro US data patterns. Comparative statics are then obtained by simulating this Þtted model. The BEJK model assumes that the total number of world varieties produced and consumed remains exogenously Þxed and relies on a speciÞc parametrization of the distribution of productivity levels.
In contrast, the current paper allows the total range of varieties produced to vary with the exposure to trade -and endogenously determines the subset of those varieties that are consumed in a given country. Despite leaving the distribution of Þrm productivity levels unrestricted, the model remains tractable enough to perform analytical comparisons of steady states that reßect different levels of exposure to trade. Although the current model only considers symmetric countries, it can easily be extended to asymmetric countries by relying on an exogenously Þxed relative wage between countries. 3 In this model, differences in country size -holding the relative wage Þxed -only affect the relative number of Þrms, and not their productivity distribution. This straightforward extension is therefore omitted for expositional simplicity.
One last, but important, innovation in the current paper is to introduce the dynamic forwardlooking entry decision of Þrms facing sunk market entry costs. Firms face such costs -not just for their domestic market -but also for any potential export market. 4 These costs are in addition to the per-unit trade costs that are typically modeled. Both survey and econometric work has documented the importance of such export market entry costs. Das, Roberts and Tybout (2001) econometrically estimate these costs average over U.S. $1 Million for Colombian plants producing industrial chemicals. As will be detailed later, surveys reveal that managers making export related decisions are much more concerned with export costs that are Þxed in nature rather than high perunit costs. Furthermore, Roberts and Tybout (1997a) (for Colombia); Bernard and Jensen (2001) (for the U.S.); and Bernard and Wagner (2001) (for Germany) estimate that the magnitude of sunk export market entry costs is important enough to generate very large hysteresis effects associated with a plant's export market participation. 5
Setup of the Model Demand
The preferences of a representative consumer are given by a C.E.S. utility function over a continuum of goods indexed by ω:
, where the measure of the set Ω represents the mass of available goods. These goods are substitutes, implying 0 < ρ < 1 and an elasticity of substitution between any two goods of σ = 1/ (1 − ρ) >
1.
As was originally shown by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) , consumer behavior can be modeled by considering the set of varieties consumed as an aggregate good Q ≡ U associated with an aggregate
These aggregates can then be used to derive the optimal consumption and expenditure decisions for individual varieties using
where R = P Q = R ω∈Ω r(ω)dω denotes aggregate expenditure.
Production
There is a continuum of Þrms, each choosing to produce a different variety ω. Production requires only one factor, labor, which is inelastically supplied at its aggregate level L -an index of the economy's size. Firm technology is represented by a cost function that exhibits constant marginal cost with a Þxed overhead cost. Labor used is thus a linear function of output q: l = f + q/ϕ. All
Þrms share the same Þxed cost f > 0 but have different productivity levels indexed by ϕ > 0. For 5 Sunk export market entry costs also explain the higher survival probabilities of exporting Þrms -even after controlling for their higher measured productivity. See Jensen (1999a, 2002) for evidence on U.S. Þrms. expositional simplicity, higher productivity is modeled as producing a symmetric variety at lower marginal cost. Higher productivity may also be thought of as producing a higher quality variety at equal cost. 6 Regardless of its productivity, each Þrm faces a residual demand curve with constant elasticity σ and thus chooses the same proÞt maximizing markup equal to σ/ (σ − 1) = 1/ρ. This yields a pricing rule
where w is the common wage rate hereafter normalized to one. Firm proÞt is then
where r(ϕ) is Þrm revenue and r(ϕ)/σ is variable proÞt. r(ϕ), and hence π(ϕ), also depend on the aggregate price and revenue as shown in (2):
On the other hand, the ratios of any two Þrms' outputs and revenues only depend on the ratio of their productivity levels:
In summary, a more productive Þrm (higher ϕ) will be bigger (larger output and revenues), charge a lower price, and earn higher proÞts than a less productive Þrm.
Aggregation
An equilibrium will be characterized by a mass M of Þrms (and hence M goods) and a distribution µ(ϕ) of productivity levels over a subset of (0, ∞). In such an equilibrium, the aggregate price P deÞned in (1) is then given by
6 Given the form of product differentiation, the modeling of either type of productivity difference is isomorphic.
Using the pricing rule (3), this can be written
ϕ is a weighted average of the Þrm productivity levels ϕ and is independent of the number of Þrms M . 7 These weights reßect the relative output shares of Þrms with different productivity levels. 8φ also represents aggregate productivity because it completely summarizes the information in the distribution of productivity levels µ(ϕ) relevant for all aggregate variables (see appendix):
where R = R ∞ 0 r(ϕ)Mµ(ϕ) dϕ and Π = R ∞ 0 π(ϕ)Mµ(ϕ) dϕ represent aggregate revenue (or expenditure) and proÞt. Thus, an industry comprised of M Þrms with any distribution of productivity levels µ(ϕ) that yields the same average productivity levelφ will also induce the same aggregate outcome as an industry with M representative Þrms sharing the same productivity level ϕ =φ. This variable will be alternatively referred to as aggregate or average productivity. Further note thatr = R/M andπ = Π/M represent both the average revenue and proÞt per Þrm as well as the revenue and proÞt level of the Þrm with average productivity level ϕ =φ.
Firm Entry and Exit
There is a large (unbounded) pool of prospective entrants into the industry. Prior to entry, Þrms are identical. To enter, Þrms must Þrst make an initial investment, modeled as a Þxed entry cost f e > 0 (measured in units of labor), which is thereafter sunk. Firms then draw their initial productivity parameter ϕ from a common distribution g(ϕ). 9 g(ϕ) has positive support over (0, ∞) and has a continuous cumulative distribution G(ϕ).
Upon entry with a low productivity draw, a Þrm may decide to immediately exit and not produce. If the Þrm does produce, it then faces a constant (across productivity levels) probability 7 Subsequent conditions on the equilibrium µ(ϕ) must of course ensure thatφ is Þnite. 8 Using q(ϕ)/q(φ) = (ϕ/φ) σ (see (6)),φ can be written asφ
φ is therefore the weighted harmonic mean of the ϕ's where the weights q(ϕ)/q(φ) index the Þrms' relative output shares. 9 This captures the fact that Þrms can not know their own productivity with certainty until they start producing and selling their good. (Recall that productivity differences may reßect cost differences as well as differences in consumer valuations of the good.) δ in every period of a bad shock that would force it to exit. Although there are some realistic examples of severe shocks that would constrain a Þrm to exit independently of productivity (such as natural disasters, new regulation, product liability, major changes in consumer tastes), it is also likely that exit may be caused by a series of bad shocks affecting the Þrm's productivity. This type of Þrm level process is explicitly modeled by Hopenhayn (1992a Hopenhayn ( , 1992b . The simpliÞcation made in this model entails that the shape of the equilibrium distribution of productivity µ(ϕ) and the ex-ante survival probabilities are exogenously determined by g(ϕ) and δ. On the other hand, the range of productivity levels (for surviving Þrms), and hence the average productivity level, are endogenously determined. 10 Importantly, this simpliÞed industry model will nevertheless generate one of the most robust empirical patterns highlighted by micro-level studies: new entrants (including the Þrms whose entry is unsuccessful) will have, on average, lower productivity and a higher probability of exit than incumbents. This paper only considers steady state equilibria in which the aggregate variables remain constant over time. Since each Þrm's productivity level does not change over time, its optimal per period proÞt level (excluding f e ) will also remain constant. An entering Þrm with productivity ϕ would then immediately exit if this proÞt level were negative (and hence never produce), or would produce and earn π(ϕ) ≥ 0 in every period until it is hit with the bad shock and is forced to exit.
Assuming that there is no time discounting, 11 each Þrm's value function is given by
where the dependence of π(ϕ) on R and P from (5) is understood. Thus, ϕ * = inf{ϕ : v(ϕ) > 0} identiÞes the lowest productivity level (hereafter referred to as the cutoff level) of producing Þrms.
Since π(0) = −f is negative, π(ϕ * ) must be equal to zero. This will be referred to as the zero cutoff proÞt condition.
Any entering Þrm drawing a productivity level ϕ < ϕ * will immediately exit and never produce.
Since subsequent Þrm exit is assumed to be un-correlated with productivity, the exit process will not affect the equilibrium productivity distribution µ(ϕ). This distribution must then be determined by the initial productivity draw, conditional on successful entry. Hence, µ(ϕ) is the conditional 10 The increased tractability afforded by this simpliÞcation permits the detailed analysis of the impact of trade on this endogenous range of productivity levels and on the distribution of market shares and proÞts across this range.
11 Again, this is assumed for simplicity. The probability of exit δ introduces an effect similar to time discounting. Modeling an additional time discount factor would not qualitatively change any of the results. distribution of g(ϕ) on [ϕ * , ∞):
and p in ≡ 1 − G(ϕ * ) is the ex-ante probability of successful entry. 12 This deÞnes the aggregate productivity levelφ as a function of the cutoff level ϕ * : 13
The assumption of a Þniteφ imposes certain restrictions on the size of the upper tail of the distribution g(ϕ): the (σ − 1) th un-centered moment of g(ϕ) must be Þnite. (8) clearly shows how the shape of the equilibrium distribution of productivity levels is tied to the exogenous ex-
while allowing the range of productivity levels (indexed by the cutoff ϕ * )
to be endogenously determined. (9) then shows how this endogenous range affects the aggregate productivity level.
Zero Cutoff ProÞt Condition
Since the average productivity levelφ is completely determined by the cutoff productivity level ϕ * , the average proÞt and revenue levels are also tied to the cutoff level ϕ * (see (6)):
The zero cutoff proÞt condition, by pinning down the revenue of the cutoff Þrm, then implies a relationship between the average proÞt per Þrm and the cutoff productivity level:
where
12 The equilibrium distribution µ(ϕ) can be determined from the distribution of initial productivity with certainty by applying a law of large numbers to g(ϕ). See Hopenhayn (1992a, Note 5) for further details.
13 This dependence ofφ on ϕ * is understood when it is subsequently written without its argument.
Free Entry and the Value of Firms
Since all incumbent Þrms -other than the cutoff Þrm -earn positive proÞts, the average proÞt level π must be positive. In fact, the expectation of future positive proÞts is the only reason that Þrms consider sinking the investment cost f e required for entry. Letv represent the present value of the average proÞt ßows:v = P ∞ t=0 (1 − δ) tπ = (1/δ)π.v is also the average value of Þrms, conditional on successful entry:
Further deÞne v e to be the net value of entry:
If this value were negative, no Þrm would want to enter. In any equilibrium where entry is unrestricted, this value could further not be positive since the mass of prospective entrants is unbounded.
Equilibrium in a Closed Economy
The free entry (FE) and zero cutoff proÞt (ZCP) conditions represent two different relationships linking the average proÞt levelπ with the cutoff productivity level ϕ * (see (10) and (11)):
In (ϕ, π) space, the FE curve is increasing and is cut by the ZCP curve only once from above (see appendix for proof). This ensures the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium ϕ * andπ, which is graphically represented in Figure 1 . 14 In a stationary equilibrium, the aggregate variables must also remain constant over time. This requires a mass M e of new entrants in every period, such that the mass of successful entrants, p in M e , exactly replaces the mass δM of incumbents who are hit with the bad shock and exit:
The equilibrium distribution of productivity µ(ϕ) is not affected by this simultaneous entry and exit since the successful entrants and failing incumbents have the same distribution of productivity levels. The labor used by these new entrants for investment purposes must, of course, be reßected in the accounting for aggregate labor L, and affects the aggregate labor available for production:
14 The ZCP curve need not be decreasing everywhere as represented in the graph. However, it will monotonically decrease from inÞnity to zero for ϕ * ∈ (0, +∞) as shown in the graph if g(ϕ) belongs to one of several common families of distributions: lognormal, exponential, gamma, Weibul, or truncations on (0, +∞) of the normal, logistic, extreme value, or Laplace distributions. (A sufficient condition is that
where L p and L e represent, respectively, the aggregate labor used for production and investment (by new entrants). Aggregate payments to production workers L p must match the difference between aggregate revenue and proÞt: L p = R − Π (this is also the labor market clearing condition for production workers). The market clearing condition for investment workers requires L e = M e f e . Using the aggregate stability condition, p in M e = δM, and the free entry condition,
, L e can be written:
Thus, aggregate revenue R = L p + Π = L p + L e must also equal the total payments to labor L and is therefore exogenously Þxed by this index of country size. 15 The mass of producing Þrms in any period can then be determined from the average proÞt level using:
This, in turn, determines the equilibrium price index
completes the characterization of the unique stationary equilibrium in the closed economy.
Analysis of the Equilibrium
All the Þrm-level variables -the productivity cutoff ϕ * and averageφ, and the average Þrm proÞt π and revenuer -are independent of the country size L. As indicated by (13), the mass of Þrms increases proportionally with country size, although the distribution of Þrm productivity levels µ(ϕ) remains unchanged. Welfare per worker, given by
is higher in a larger country due only to increased product variety. This inßuence of country size on the determination of aggregate variables is identical to that derived by Krugman (1980) with representative Þrms. Onceφ andπ are determined, the aggregate outcome predicted by this 15 It is important to emphasize that this result is not a direct consequence of aggregation and market clearing conditions: it is a property of the model's stationary equilibrium. Aggregate income need not necessarily equal the payments to all workers, since there may be some investment income derived from the Þnancing of new entrants. Each new entrant raises the capital fe, which provides a random return of π(ϕ) (if ϕ ≥ ϕ * ) or zero (if ϕ < ϕ * ) in every period. In equilibrium, the aggregate return Π equals the aggregate investment cost L e in every period -so there is no net investment income (this would not be the case with a positive time discount factor). model is identical to one generated by an economy with representative Þrms who share the same productivity levelφ and proÞt levelπ. On the other hand, this model with heterogeneous Þrms explains how the aggregate productivity levelφ and the average Þrm proÞt levelπ are endogenously determined and how both can change in response to various shocks. In particular, a country's production technology (referenced by the distribution g(ϕ)) need not change in order to induce changes in aggregate productivity. In the following sections, I argue that the exposure of a country to trade creates precisely the type of shock that induces reallocations between Þrms and generates increases in aggregate productivity. These results can not be explained by representative Þrm models where the aggregate productivity level is exogenously given as the productivity level common to all Þrms. Changes in aggregate productivity can then only result from changes in Þrm level technology and not from reallocations.
Overview and Assumptions of the Open Economy Model
I now examine the impact of trade in a world (or trade bloc) that is composed of countries whose economies are of the type that was previously described. When there are no additional costs associated with trade, then trade allows the individual countries to replicate the outcome of the integrated world economy. Trade then provides the same opportunities to an open economy as would an increase in country size to a closed economy. As was previously discussed, an increase in country size has no effect on Þrm level outcomes. The transition to trade will thus not affect any of the Þrm level variables: The same number of Þrms in each country produce at the same output levels and earn the same proÞts as they did in the closed economy. All Þrms in a given country divide their sales between domestic and foreign consumers, based on the size of their country relative to the integrated world economy. Thus, in the absence of any costs to trade, the existence of Þrm heterogeneity does not affect the impact of trade. This impact is identical to the one described by Krugman (1980) with representative Þrms: Although Þrms are not affected by the transition to trade, consumers enjoy welfare gains driven by the increase in product variety. 16 16 The irrelevance of Þrm heterogeneity for the impact of trade is not just a consequence of negligible trade costs. The assumption of an exogenously Þxed elasticity of substitution between varieties also plays a signiÞcant role in this result. The presence of heterogeneity (even in the absence of trade costs) plays a signiÞcant role in determining the impact of trade once this assumption is dropped. In a separate appendix (available upon request to the author), the current model is modiÞed by allowing the elasticity of substitution to endogenously increase with product variety. This link between trade and the elasticity of substitution was studied by Krugman (1979) with representative Þrms. In the context of the current model, the appendix shows how the size of the economy then affects the aggregate productivity level and the skewness of market shares and proÞts across Þrms with different productivity levels. Larger economies have higher aggregate productivity levels -even though they have the same Þrm level technology index by g(ϕ). Therefore, even in the absence of trade costs, trade increases the size of the "world" economy and induces
On the other hand, there is mounting evidence that Þrms wishing to export not only face perunit costs (such as transport costs and tariffs), but also -critically -face some Þxed costs that do not vary with export volume. Interviews with managers making export decisions conÞrm that Þrms in differentiated product industries face signiÞcant Þxed costs associated with the entry into export markets (see Roberts and Tybout (1997b) ): A Þrm must Þnd and inform foreign buyers about its product and learn about the foreign market. It must then research the foreign regulatory environment and adapt its product to ensure that it conforms to foreign standards (which include testing, packaging, and labeling requirements). An exporting Þrm must also set up new distribution channels in the foreign country and conform to all the shipping rules speciÞed by the foreign customs agency. Although some of these costs can not be avoided, others are often manipulated by governments in order to erect non-tariff barriers to trade. Regardless of their origin, these costs are most appropriately modeled as independent of the Þrm's export volume decision. 17 When there is uncertainty concerning the export market, the timing and sunk nature of the costs become quite relevant for the export decision (most of the previously mentioned costs must be sunk prior to entry into the export market). The strong and robust empirical correlations at the Þrm level between export status and productivity suggest that the export market entry decision occurs after the Þrm gains knowledge of its productivity, and hence that uncertainty concerning the export markets is not predominantly about productivity (as is the uncertainty prior to entry into the industry). I therefore assume that a Þrm who wishes to export must make an initial Þxed investment, but that this investment decision occurs after the Þrm's productivity is revealed. For simplicity, I do not model any additional uncertainty concerning the export markets. The per-unit trade costs are modeled in the standard iceberg formulation, whereby τ > 1 units of a good must be shipped in order for 1 unit to arrive at destination.
Although the size of a country relative to the rest of the world (which constitutes its trading partners) is left unrestricted, I do assume that the world (or trading group) is comprised of some number of identical countries. This assumption is made in order to ensure factor price equalization across countries and hence focus the analysis on Þrm selection effects that are independent of wage differences. 18 In this model with trade costs, size differences across countries will induce differences reallocations of market shares and proÞts towards more productive Þrms and generates an aggregate productivity gain. 17 The modeling of a Þxed export cost is not new. Bernard and Jensen (1999a) , Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998) , Roberts and Tybout (1997a) , and Roberts, Sullivan and Tybout (1995) all introduce a Þxed export cost into the theoretical sections of their work in order to explain the self-selection of Þrms into the export market. However, these analyses are restricted to a partial equilibrium setting in which the distribution of Þrm productivity levels is Þxed.
18 As was previously mentioned, another way to abstract from endogenous relative wage movements when countries in equilibrium wage levels. These wage differences then generate further Þrm selection effects and aggregate productivity differences across countries. 19 I therefore assume that the economy under study can trade with n ≥ 1 other countries (the world is then comprised of n + 1 ≥ 2 countries).
Firms can export their products to any country, although entry into each of these export markets requires a Þxed investment cost of f ex > 0 (measured in units of labor). Regardless of export status, a Þrm still incurs the same overhead production cost f .
Equilibrium in the Open Economy
The symmetry assumption ensures that all countries share the same wage, which is still normalized to one, and also share the same aggregate variables. Each Þrm's pricing rule in its domestic market is given, as before, by p d (ϕ) = w/ρϕ = 1/ρϕ. Firms who export will set higher prices in the foreign markets that reßect the increased marginal cost τ of serving these markets:
. Thus, the revenues earned from domestic sales and export sales to any given country are, respectively, r d (ϕ) = R(P ρϕ) σ−1 and r x (ϕ) = τ 1−σ r d (ϕ), where R and P denote the aggregate expenditure and price index in every country. The balance of payments condition implies that R also represents the aggregate revenue of Þrms in any country, and hence aggregate income. The combined revenue of a Þrm, r(ϕ), thus depends on its export status:
if the Þrm does not export,
If some Þrms do not export, then there no longer exists an integrated world market for all goods.
Even though the symmetry assumption ensures that all the characteristics of the goods available in every country are similar, the actual bundle of goods available will be different across countries:
consumers in each country have access to goods (produced by the non-exporting Þrms) that are not available to consumers in any other country.
are asymmetric is to introduce a freely traded homogeneous good sector. See Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2002) for an example incorporating this extension. 19 In these asymmetric equilibria with Þxed export costs, large countries enjoy higher aggregate productivity, welfare, and wages relative to smaller countries.
Firm Entry, Exit, and Export Status
All the exogenous factors affecting Þrm entry, exit, and productivity levels remain unchanged by trade. Prior to entry, Þrms face the same ex-ante distribution of productivity levels g(ϕ) and probability δ of the bad shock. In a stationary equilibrium, any incumbent Þrm with productivity ϕ earns variable proÞts r x (ϕ)/σ in every period from its export sales to any given country. Since the export cost is assumed equal across countries, a Þrm will either export to all countries in every period or never export. 20 Given that the export decision occurs after Þrms know their productivity ϕ, and since there is no additional export market uncertainty, Þrms are indifferent between paying the one time investment cost f ex , or paying the amortized per-period portion of this cost f x = δf ex in every period (as before, there is no additional time discounting other than the probability of the exit inducing shock δ). This per-period representation of the export cost is henceforth adopted for notational simplicity. In the stationary equilibrium, the aggregate labor resources used in every period to cover the export costs do not depend on this choice of representation. 21 The per-period proÞt ßow of any exporting Þrm then reßects the per-period Þxed cost f x , which is incurred per export country.
Since no Þrm will ever export and not also produce for its domestic market, 22 each Þrm's proÞt can be separated into portions earned from domestic sales, π d (ϕ), and export sales per country, π x (ϕ), by accounting for the entire overhead production cost in domestic proÞt:
A Þrm who produces for its domestic market exports to all n countries if π x (ϕ) ≥ 0. Each Þrm's combined proÞt can then be written: π(ϕ) = π d (ϕ) + max {0, nπ x (ϕ)} . Similarly to the closed economy case, Þrm value is given by v(ϕ) = max {0, π(ϕ)/δ}, and ϕ * = inf {ϕ : v(ϕ) > 0} identiÞes the cutoff productivity level for successful entry. Additionally, ϕ * x = inf {ϕ : ϕ ≥ ϕ * and π x (ϕ) > 0} now represents the cutoff productivity level for exporting Þrms. If ϕ * x = ϕ * , then all Þrms in the industry export. In this case, the cutoff Þrm (with productivity level ϕ * = ϕ * x ) earns zero total proÞt 20 The restriction that export costs are equal across countries can be relaxed. Some Þrms then export to some countries but not others -depending on these cost differences. This extension would also generate an increasing relationship between a Þrm's productivity and the number of its export destinations. 21 In one case, only the new entrants who export expend resources to cover the full investment cost fex. In the other case, all exporting Þrms expend resources to cover the smaller amortized portion of the cost f x = δf ex . In equilibrium, the ratio of new exporters to all exporters is δ (see appendix), so the same aggregate labor resources are expended in either case. 22 A Þrm would earn strictly higher proÞts by also producing for its domestic market since the associated variable proÞt r d (ϕ)/σ is always positive and the overhead production cost f is already incurred.
(π(ϕ * ) = π d (ϕ * ) + nπ x (ϕ * ) = 0) and non-negative export proÞt (π x (ϕ * ) ≥ 0). If ϕ * x > ϕ * , then some Þrms (with productivity levels between ϕ * and ϕ * x ) produce exclusively for their domestic market. These Þrms do not export as their export proÞts would be negative. They earn nonnegative proÞts exclusively from their domestic sales. The Þrms with productivity levels above ϕ * x earn positive proÞts from both their domestic and export sales. By their deÞnition, the cutoff levels must then satisfy π d (ϕ * ) = 0 and π x (ϕ * x ) = 0. This partitioning of Þrms by export status will occur if and only if τ σ−1 f x > f: the trade costs relative to the overhead production cost must be above a threshold level. Note that, when there are no Þxed export costs (f x = 0), no level of variable cost τ > 1 can induce this partitioning.
However, a large enough Þxed export cost f x > f will induce partitioning even when there are no variable trade costs. As the partitioning of Þrms by export status (within sectors) is empirically ubiquitous, I will henceforth assume that the combination of Þxed and variable trade costs are high enough to generate partitioning, and therefore that τ σ−1 f x > f. Although the equilibrium where all Þrms export will not be formally derived, it exhibits several similar properties to the equilibrium with partitioning that will be highlighted. 23 Once again, the equilibrium distribution of productivity levels for incumbent Þrms, µ(ϕ), is determined by the ex-ante distribution of productivity levels, conditional on successful entry:
still identiÞes the ex-ante probability of successful entry. Furthermore,
] now represents the ex-ante probability that one of these successful Þrms will export. p x must then also represent the ex-post fraction of Þrms that export. Let M denote the equilibrium mass of incumbent Þrms in any country. M x = p x M then represents the mass of exporting Þrms while M t = M + n M x represents the total mass of varieties available to consumers in any country (or alternatively, the total mass of Þrms competing in any country).
Aggregation
Using the same weighted average function deÞned in (9), letφ =φ(ϕ * ) andφ x =φ(ϕ * x ) denote the average productivity levels of, respectively, all Þrms and exporting Þrms only. The average productivity across all Þrms,φ, is based only on domestic market share differences between Þrms (as reßected by differences in the Þrms' productivity levels). If some Þrms do not export, then this average will not reßect the additional export shares of the more productive Þrms. Furthermore, neitherφ norφ x reßect the proportion τ of output units that are "lost" in export transit. Let ϕ t be the weighted productivity average that reßects the combined market share of all Þrms and the output shrinkage linked to exporting. Again, using the weighted average function (9), this combined average productivity can be written:
By symmetry,φ t is also the weighted average productivity of all Þrms (domestic and foreign) competing in a single country (where the productivity of exporters is adjusted by the trade cost τ ). As was the case in the closed economy, this productivity average plays an important role as it once again completely summarizes the effects of the distribution of productivity levels µ(ϕ) on the aggregate outcome. Thus, the aggregate price index P , expenditure level R, and welfare per worker W in any country can then be written as functions of only the productivity averageφ t and the number of varieties consumed M t : 24
By construction, the productivity averagesφ andφ x can also be used to express the average proÞt and revenue levels across different groups of Þrms: r d (φ) and π d (φ) represent the average revenue and proÞt earned by domestic Þrms from sales in their own country. Similarly, r x (φ x ) and π x (φ x ) represent the average export revenue and proÞt (to any given country) across all domestic
Þrms who export. The overall average -across all domestic Þrms -of combined revenue,r, and proÞt,π (earned from both domestic and export sales), are then given by:
Equilibrium Conditions
As in the closed economy equilibrium, the zero cutoff proÞt condition will imply a relationship between the average proÞt per Þrmπ and the cutoff productivity level ϕ * (see (10)):
where k(ϕ) = [φ(ϕ)/ϕ] σ−1 − 1 as was previously deÞned. The zero cutoff proÞt condition also implies that ϕ * x can be written as a function of ϕ * :
Using (18),π can therefore be expressed as a function of the cutoff level ϕ * :
where ϕ * x , and hence p x , are implicitly deÞned as functions of ϕ * using (19). (20) thus identiÞes the new zero cutoff proÞt condition for the open economy.
As before,v = P ∞ t=0 (1 − δ) tπ =π/δ represents the present value of the average proÞt ßows and v e = p inv − f e yields the net value of entry. The free entry condition thus remains unchanged: v e = 0 if and only ifπ = δf e /p in . Regardless of proÞt differences across Þrms (based on export status), the expected value of future proÞts, in equilibrium, must equal the Þxed investment cost.
Determination of the Equilibrium
As in the closed economy case, the free entry condition and the new zero cutoff proÞt condition identify a unique ϕ * andπ: the new ZCP curve still cuts the FE curve only once from above (see appendix for proof). The equilibrium ϕ * , in turn, determines the export productivity cutoff ϕ * x as well as the average productivity levelsφ,φ x ,φ t , and the ex-ante successful entry and export probabilities p in and p x . As was the case in the closed economy equilibrium, the free entry condition and the aggregate stability condition, p in M e = δM, ensure that the aggregate payment to the investment workers L e equals the aggregate proÞt level Π. Thus, aggregate revenue R remains exogenously Þxed by the size of the labor force: R = L. Once again, the average Þrm revenue is determined by the ZCP and FE conditions:r = r d (φ) + p x nr x (φ x ) = σ(π + f + p x nf x ). This pins down the equilibrium mass of incumbent Þrms,
In turn, this determines the mass of variety available in every country, M t = (1 + np x )M , and their (17)). Almost all of these equilibrium conditions also apply to the case where all Þrms export. The only difference is that ϕ * x = ϕ * (and hence p x = 1) and (19) no longer holds.
The Impact of Trade
The result that the modeling of Þxed export costs explains the partitioning of Þrms by export status and productivity level is not exactly earth-shattering. This can be explained quite easily within (12) immediately reveals that the ZCP curve shifts up: the exposure to trade induces an increase in the cutoff productivity level (ϕ * > ϕ * a ) and in the average proÞt per Þrm. The least productive Þrms with productivity levels between ϕ * a and ϕ * can no longer earn positive proÞts in the new trade equilibrium and therefore exit. Another selection process also occurs since only the Þrms with productivity levels above ϕ * x enter the export markets. This export market selection effect and the domestic market selection effect (of Þrms out of the industry) both reallocate market shares towards more efficient Þrms and contribute to an aggregate productivity gain. 25 Inspection of the equations for the equilibrium number of Þrms ( (13) and (21) 
The Reallocation of Market Shares and ProÞts Across Firms
I now examine the effects of trade on Þrms with different productivity levels. To do this, I contrast the performance of a Þrm with productivity ϕ ≥ ϕ * a before and after the transition to trade. Let r a (ϕ) > 0 and π a (ϕ) ≥ 0 denote the Þrm's revenue and proÞt in autarky. Recall that, in both the closed and open economy equilibria, the aggregate revenue of domestic Þrms is exogenously given by the country's size (R = L). Hence, r a (ϕ)/R and r(ϕ)/R represent the Þrm's market share (within the domestic industry) in autarky and in the equilibrium with trade. Additionally, in this equilibrium with trade, r d (ϕ)/R represents the Þrm's share of its domestic market (since R also represents aggregate consumer expenditure in the country). The impact of trade on this Þrm's market share can be evaluated using the following inequalities (see appendix):
The Þrst part of the inequality indicates that all Þrms incur a loss in domestic sales in the open economy. A Þrm who does not export then also incurs a total revenue loss. The second part of the inequality indicates that a Þrm who exports more than makes up for its loss of domestic sales 25 Becauseφ t factors in the output lost in export transit (from τ ), it is possible forφ t to be lower thanφ a when τ is high and fx is low. It is shown in the appendix that any productivity average that is based on a Þrm's output "at the factory gate " must be higher in the open economy. 26 Recall that the average proÞtπ must be higher in the open economy equilibrium.
with export sales and increases its total revenues. Thus, a Þrm who exports increases its share of industry revenues while a Þrm who does not export loses market share. (The market share of the least productive Þrms in the autarky equilibrium -with productivity between ϕ * a and ϕ * -drops to zero as these Þrms exit.)
Now consider the change in proÞt earned by a Þrm with productivity ϕ. If the Þrm does not export in the open economy, it must incur a proÞt loss, since its revenue, and hence variable proÞt, is now lower. The direction of the proÞt change for an exporting Þrm is not immediately clear since it involves a trade-off between the increase in total revenue (and hence variable proÞt) and the increase in Þxed cost due to the additional export cost. For such a Þrm (ϕ ≥ ϕ * x ), this proÞt change can be written: 27
where the term in the bracket must be positive since
The proÞt change, ∆π(ϕ), is thus an increasing function of the Þrm's productivity level ϕ. In addition, this change must be negative for the exporting Þrm with the cutoff productivity level ϕ * x : 28 Therefore, Þrms are partitioned by productivity into groups that gain and lose proÞts. Only a subset of the more productive Þrms who export gain from trade. Among Þrms in this group, the proÞt gain increases with productivity. Figure 2 graphically represents the changes in revenue and proÞts driven by trade. The exposure to trade thus generates a type of Darwinian evolution within an industry that was described in the introduction: the most efficient Þrms thrive and grow -they export and increase both their market share and proÞts. Some less efficient Þrms still export and increase their market share but incur a proÞt loss. Some even less efficient Þrms remain in the industry but do not export and incur losses of both market share and proÞt. Finally, the least efficient Þrms are driven out of the industry.
Why Does Trade Force the Least Productive Firms to Exit?
There are two potential channels through which trade can affect the distribution of surviving Þrms. The Þrst to come to mind is the increase in product market competition associated with 27 Using r d (ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ * ) σ−1 σf and r a (ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ * a ) σ−1 σf . 28 Since πx(ϕ * x ) = 0 and r d (ϕ * x ) < ra(ϕ * x ).
trade: Þrms face an increasing number of competitors; furthermore the new foreign competitors, on average, are more productive than the domestic Þrms. However, this channel is not operative in the current model due to the peculiar and restrictive property of monopolistic competition under C.E.S. preferences: the price elasticity of demand for any variety does not respond to changes in the number or prices of competing varieties. Thus, in the current model, all the effects of trade on the distribution of Þrms are channeled through a second mechanism operating through the domestic factor market where Þrms compete for a common source of labor: when entry into new export markets is costly, exposure to trade offers new proÞt opportunities only to the more productive Þrms who can "afford" to cover the entry cost. This also induces more entry as prospective Þrms respond to the higher potential returns associated with a good productivity draw. The increased labor demand by the more productive Þrms and new entrants bids up the real wage and forces the least productive Þrms to exit.
The current model thus highlights a potentially important channel for the redistributive effects of trade within industries that operates through the exposure to export markets. Recent work by Bernard and Jensen (1999b) suggests that this channel substantially contributes to U.S. productivity increases within manufacturing industries. Nevertheless, the model should also be interpreted with caution as it precludes another potentially important channel for the effects of trade, which operates through increases in import competition.
The Impact of Trade Liberalization
The preceding analysis compared the equilibrium outcomes of an economy undergoing a massive change in trade regime from autarky to trade. Very few, if any, of the world's current economies can be considered to operate in an autarky environment. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether an increase in the exposure of an economy to trade will induce the same effects as were previously described for the transition of an economy from autarky. The current model is well-suited to address several different mechanisms that would produce an increase in trade exposure and plausibly correspond to observed decreases in trade costs over time or some speciÞc policies to liberalize trade.
The effects of three such mechanisms are investigated: an increase in the number of available trading partners (resulting, for example, from the incorporation of additional countries into a trade bloc) and a decrease in either the Þxed or variable trade costs (resulting either from decreases in real costs levels or from multi-lateral agreements to reduce tariffs or non-tariff barriers to trade). These three scenarios involve comparative statics of the open economy equilibrium with respect to n, τ , and f x .
The main impact of the transition from autarky to trade was an increase in aggregate productivity and welfare generated by a reallocation of market shares towards more productive Þrms (where the least productive Þrms are forced to exit). I will show that increases in the exposure to trade occurring through any of these mechanisms will generate very similar results: in all cases, the exposure to trade will force the least productive Þrms to exit and will reallocate market shares from less productive to more productive Þrms. The increased exposure to trade will also always deliver welfare gains. 29 Increase in the Number of Trading Partners I Þrst investigate the effects of an increase in n. Throughout the comparative static analyses, I use the notation of the open economy equilibrium to describe the old equilibrium with n countries. I then add primes ( 0 ) to all variables and functions when they pertain to the new equilibrium with n 0 > n countries.
Inspection of equations (20) and (19) deÞning the new zero cutoff proÞt condition (as a function of the domestic cutoff ϕ * ) reveals that the ZCP curve will shift up and therefore that both cutoff productivity levels increase with n: ϕ * 0 > ϕ * and ϕ * 0 x > ϕ * x . The increase in the number of trading partners thus forces the least productive Þrms to exit. As was the case with the transition from autarky, the increased exposure to trade forces all Þrms to relinquish a portion of their share of their domestic market:
The less productive Þrms who do not export (with ϕ < ϕ * 0 x ) thus incur a revenue and proÞt loss -and the least productive among them exit. 30 Again, as was the case with the transition from autarky, the Þrms who export (with ϕ ≥ ϕ * 0 x ) more than make up for their loss of domestic sales with their sales to the new export markets and increase their combined revenues:
. Some of these Þrms nevertheless incur a decrease in proÞts due to the new Þxed export costs, but the most productive Þrms among this group also enjoy an increase in proÞts (which is increasing with the Þrms' productivity level). Thus, both market shares and proÞts are reallocated towards the more efficient Þrms. As was the case for 29 Formal derivations of all the comparative statics are relegated to the appendix. 30 There is a transitional issue associated with the exporting status of Þrms with productivity levels between ϕ * x and ϕ * 0
x . The loss of export sales to any given country -from r x (ϕ) down to r x 0 (ϕ) -is such that Þrms entering with productivity levels between ϕ * x and ϕ * 0 x will not export as the lower variable proÞt rx 0 (ϕ)/σ no longer covers the amortized portion of the entry cost f x . On the other hand, incumbent Þrms with productivity levels in this range have already incurred the sunk export entry cost and have no reason to exit the export markets until they are hit with the bad shock and exit the industry. Eventually, all these incumbent Þrms exit and no Þrm with a productivity level in that range will export once the new steady state equilibrium is attained. the transition from autarky, this reallocation of market shares generates an aggregate productivity gain and an increase in welfare. 31 
Decrease in Trade Costs
A decrease in the variable trade cost τ will induce almost identical effects to those just described for the increase in trading partners. The decrease from τ to τ 0 < τ (again I use primes to reference all variables and functions in the new equilibrium) will shift up the ZCP curve and induce an increase in the cutoff productivity level ϕ * 0 > ϕ * . The only difference is that the new export cutoff productivity level ϕ * 0
x will now be below ϕ * x . As before, the increased exposure to trade forces the least productive Þrms to exit, but now also generates entry of new Þrms into the export market (who did not export with the higher τ ). The direction of the reallocation of market shares and proÞts will be identical to those previously described: all Þrms lose a portion of their domestic sales, so that the Þrms who do not export incur both a market share and proÞt loss. The more productive Þrms who export more than make up for their loss of domestic sales with increased export sales, and the most productive Þrms among this group also increase their proÞts. As before, the exit of the least productive Þrms and the market share increase of the most productive Þrms both contribute to an aggregate productivity gain and an increase in welfare. 32 A decrease in the Þxed export market entry cost f x induces similar changes in the cutoff levels as the decrease in τ . The increased exposure to trade forces the least productive Þrms to exit (ϕ * rises) and generates entry of new Þrms into the export market (ϕ * x decreases). These selection effects both contribute to an aggregate productivity increase if the new exporters are more productive than the average productivity level. Although the less productive Þrms who do not export incur both a market share and proÞt loss, the market share and proÞt reallocations towards the more productive Þrms, in this case, will not be similar to those for the previous two cases: the decrease in f x will not increase the combined market share or proÞt of any Þrm that already exported prior to the change in f x -only new exporters increase their combined sales. However, as in the previous two cases, welfare is higher in the new steady state equilibrium. Both types of trade costs decreases described above also help to explain another empirical feature, reported by Roberts, Sullivan and Tybout (1995) , that some export booms are driven by the entry of new Þrms into the export markets. 33 31 As pointed out in note 25, the productivity average must be based on a Þrm's output "at the factory gate". 32 See note 31 33 Over half of the substantial export growth in Colombian and Mexican manufacturing sectors was generated by the entry of Þrms into the export markets.
Conclusion
This paper has described and analyzed a new transmission channel for the impact of trade on industry structure and performance. Since this channel works through intra-industry reallocations across Þrms, it can only be studied within an industry model that incorporates Þrm level heterogeneity. Recent empirical work has highlighted the importance of this channel for understanding and explaining the effects of trade on Þrm and industry performance.
The paper shows how the existence of export market entry costs drastically affects how the impact of trade is distributed across different types of Þrms. The induced reallocations between these different Þrms generate changes in a country's aggregate environment that can not be explained by a model based on representative Þrms. On one hand, the paper shows that the existence of such costs to trade does not affect the welfare-enhancing properties of trade: one of the most robust results of this paper is that increases in a country's exposure to trade lead to welfare gains.
On the other hand, the paper shows how the export costs signiÞcantly alter the distribution of the gains from trade across Þrms. In fact, only a portion of the Þrms -the more efficient onesreap beneÞts from trade in the form of gains in market share and proÞt. Less efficient Þrms lose both. The exposure to trade, or increases in this exposure, force the least efficient Þrms out of the industry. These trade-induced reallocations towards more efficient Þrms explain why trade may generate aggregate productivity gains without necessarily improving the productive efficiency of individual Þrms.
Although this model mainly highlights the long-run beneÞts associated with the trade-induced reallocations within an industry, the reallocation of these resources also obviously entails some short-run costs. It is therefore important to have a model that can predict the impact of trade policy on inter-Þrm reallocations in order to design accompanying policies that would address issues related to the transition towards a new regime. These policies could help palliate the transitional costs while taking care not to hinder the reallocation process. Of course, the model also clearly indicates that policies that hinder the reallocation process or otherwise interfere with the ßexibility of the factor markets may delay or even prevent a country from reaping the full beneÞts from trade. 
A Aggregation Conditions in the Closed Economy
Using the deÞnition ofφ in (7), the aggregation conditions relating the aggregate variables to the number of Þrms M and aggregate productivity levelφ are derived:
and using the deÞnition of R and Π as aggregate revenue and proÞt,
Mπ(φ).
B Closed Economy Equilibrium
Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium Cutoff Level ϕ * Following is a proof that the FE and ZCP conditions in (12) identify a unique cutoff level ϕ * and that the ZCP curve cuts the FE curve from above in (ϕ, π) space. I do this by showing that
is monotonically decreasing from inÞnity to zero on (0, ∞). (This is a sufficient condition for both properties.) Recall that
as deÞned in (9). Thus,
Its derivative and elasticity are given by:
Since j(ϕ) is non-negative and its elasticity with respect to ϕ is negative and bounded away from zero, j(ϕ) must be decreasing to zero as ϕ goes to inÞnity. Furthermore, lim ϕ→0 j(ϕ) = ∞ since
decreases from inÞnity to zero on (0, ∞).
C Open Economy Equilibrium Aggregate Labor Resources Used to Cover the Export Costs
It was asserted in note 21 that the ratio of new exporters to all exporters was δ, and hence that the aggregate labor resources used to cover the export cost did not depend on its representation as either a one time sunk entry cost or a per-period Þxed cost. As before, let M e denote the mass of all new entrants. The ratio of new exporters to all exporters is then p x p in M e /p x M . This ratio must be equal to δ as the aggregate stability condition for the equilibrium ensures that p in M e = δM .
Existence and Uniqueness of the Equilibrium Cutoff Level ϕ *
Following is a proof that the FE condition and the new ZCP condition in (20) identify a unique cutoff level ϕ * and that this new ZCP curve cuts the FE curve from above in (ϕ, π) space. These
A-2 where ϕ * x = τ (f x /f ) 1/(σ−1) ϕ * is implicitly deÞned as a function of ϕ * (see (19)). Since j(ϕ) is decreasing from inÞnity to zero on (0, ∞), the left hand side in (C.1) must also monotonically decrease from inÞnity to zero on (0, ∞). Therefore, (C.1) identiÞes a unique cutoff level ϕ * and the new ZCP curve must cut the FE curve from above.
D The Impact of Trade Welfare
Using (14), welfare per worker in autarky can be written as a function of the cutoff productivity level: 34
Similarly, welfare in the open economy can also be written as a function of the new cutoff productivity level (see (17)): 35
Since ϕ * > ϕ * a , welfare in the open economy must be higher than in autarky: W > W a .
Reallocations
Proof that r d (ϕ) < r a (ϕ) < r d (ϕ) + n r x (ϕ) = ¡ 1 + n τ 1−σ ¢ r d (ϕ)
Recall that r a (ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ * a ) σ−1 σf (∀ ϕ ≥ ϕ * a ) in autarky and that r d (ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ * ) σ−1 σf (∀ ϕ ≥ ϕ * ) in the open economy equilibrium. This immediately yields r d (ϕ) < r a (ϕ) since ϕ * > ϕ * a . The second inequality is a direct consequence of another comparative static involving τ . It is shown in a following section that (1 + nτ 1−σ )r d (ϕ) decreases as τ increases. Since the autarky equilibrium is obtained as the limiting equilibrium as τ increases to inÞnity, r a (ϕ) = lim τ →+∞ r d (ϕ) = lim τ →+∞ £¡ 1 + n τ 1−σ ¢ r d (ϕ) ¤ . Therefore, r a (ϕ) < ¡ 1 + nτ 1−σ ¢ r d (ϕ) for any Þnite τ .
Aggregate Productivity
It was pointed out in the paper that aggregate productivityφ t in the open economy may not be higher thanφ a due to the effect of the output loss incurred in export transit. It was then claimed that a productivity average based on a measure of output "at the factory gate" would always be 
E The Impact of Trade Liberalization
Changes in the cutoff levels
These comparative statics are all derived from the equilibrium condition for the cutoff levels (C.1) and the implicit deÞnition of ϕ * x as a function of ϕ * in (19).
Increase in n
Differentiating (C.1) with respect to n and using ∂ϕ * x /∂n = (ϕ * x /ϕ * ) ∂ϕ * /∂n from (19) yields:
, (E.1)
Hence ∂ϕ * /∂n > 0 and ∂ϕ * x /∂n > 0 since j 0 (ϕ) < 0 ∀ϕ (see (B.4)).
Decrease in τ
Differentiating (C.1) with respect to τ and using ∂ϕ * x /∂τ = ϕ * x /τ + (ϕ * x /ϕ * ) ∂ϕ * /∂τ from (19) yields:
since j 0 (ϕ) < 0 ∀ϕ, and ∂ϕ *
36 This is the standard way of computing industry productivity averages in empirical work. 37 This result is a direct consequence of the market share re-allocation result.
A-4
Decrease in f x Differentiating (C.1) with respect to f x and using ∂ϕ * x /∂f x = (ϕ * x /ϕ * ) ∂ϕ * /∂f x + [1/ (σ − 1)] ϕ * x /f x from (19) and j 0 (ϕ * x ) ϕ * x = −(σ − 1) [j(ϕ * x ) + 1 − G(ϕ * x )] from (B.2) and (B.4) yields:
since j 0 (ϕ) < 0 ∀ϕ, and
Welfare
Recall from (D.1) that welfare per worker is given by W = ρ (L/σf ) 1/(σ−1) ϕ * . Welfare must therefore rise with increases in n and decreases in f x or τ since all of these changes induce an increase in the cutoff productivity level ϕ * .
Re-allocations of Market Shares
Recall that r d (ϕ) = (ϕ/ϕ * ) σ−1 σf (∀ϕ ≥ ϕ * ) in the new open economy equilibrium. r d (ϕ) therefore decreases with increases in n and decreases in f x or τ since all of these changes induce an increase in the cutoff productivity level ϕ * . Thus r 0 d (ϕ) < r d (ϕ) ∀ϕ ≥ ϕ * whenever n 0 > n, τ 0 < τ, or f 0 x < f x (since ϕ * 0 > ϕ * ). The direction of the change in combined domestic and export sales, r d (ϕ)+nr x (ϕ) = ¡ 1 + nτ 1−σ ¢ r d (ϕ), will depend on the direction of the change in ¡ 1 + nτ 1−σ ¢ / (ϕ * ) σ−1 . It is therefore clear that a Þrm's combined sales will decrease in the same proportion as its domestic sales when f x decreases since 1 + n τ 1−σ will remain constant. On the other hand, it is now shown that these combined sales will increase when n increases or τ decreases as ¡ 1 + nτ 1−σ ¢ / (ϕ * ) σ−1 will then increase:
with productivity levels ϕ ≥ ϕ * x who export both before and after the change in τ enjoy a proÞt increase that is proportional to their combined revenue increase (their Þxed costs do not change) and is increasing in their productivity level ϕ:
where the term in the bracket must be positive.
Changes in Aggregate Productivity
Any productivity average based on (D.2) must increase when n increases or τ decreases as the new distribution of Þrm revenues r 0 (ϕ)g(ϕ)/R Þrst order stochastically dominates the old one r(ϕ)g(ϕ)/R: R ϕ o r 0 (ξ)g (ξ) dξ ≤ R ϕ o r(ξ)g (ξ) dξ ∀ϕ. 40 Note that this property does not hold when f x decreases as the revenues of the most productive Þrms are not higher with the lower f x .
Nevertheless, the productivity average Φ will rise when f x decreases so long as the new exporters are more productive than the average (ϕ * x > Φ).
